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In this article we outline and explain Roderick Chisholm's 
extraordinary claim that the person is literally identical with 
a microscopic particle in that person's brain, show that his 
argument for this view provides no support for it and construct a 
distinct line of argument which appears to establish a pre-
sumption in its favor. 
In his "Is There a Mind-Body Problem?", Chisholm holds 
that the person is literally identical with an "intact, non-suc-
cessive" microscopic particle in that person's brain. 1 
(Henceforth we will refer to this view as Chisholm's 
"microparticle thesis.") What Chisholm means by saying that 
this microparticle is an "intact, non-successive" entity is, "at 
any moment of its existence, it has precisely the same parts it 
has at any other moment of its existence; at no time during 
which it exists does it have a part it does not have at any other 
time during which it exists."2 His argument for this 
remarkable claim can be reconstructed as follows. There are 
such things as persons. A person is either a physical thing or a 
nonphysical thing. Nothing we know about persons justifies us 
in assuming that persons are nonphysical things. Therefore, 
persons are physical things. In addition, there are good reasons 
to believe the person is not identical with his gross, 
macroscopic physical body. 3 Therefore, the most plausible 
conclusion is that the person is literally identical with some 
proper part of this macroscopic body, "some intact, non-
successive part that has been in this larger body all along," 
most likely a microparticle located within the brain.4 
1Roderick Chisholm, "Is There a Mind-Body Problem?", Philosophic 
Exchange, 2 (Summer 1978): 31. 
Chisholm, "Mind-Body Problem," p. 30. 
^ e r m s such as "his" and "he" should be taken where appropriate as 
abbreviations for "his or her" and "he or she," respectively. 
4Chisholm, "Mind-Body Problem", pp. 25-30. 
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This sketch of Chisholm's argument requires elaboration 
and explanation. Chisholm opens "Is There a Mind-Body 
Problem?" 
by arguing that there is no reason whatever to believe that in 
addition to bodies and persons there are such things as minds, 
i.e., nonphysical, substantial, mental entities. His reasoning 
for this contention is that everything which we want to say 
about persons' mental properties and potentialities can be said 
without positing an additional entity, the mind, for there is 
nothing inconsistent in saying that persons are physical entities 
which have the capacity to think, feel, etc. Chisholm seems to 
be quite right in this regard. Thus, Chisholm's assertion that 
nothing we know about persons justifies our assuming that 
persons are nonphysical things seems to be true. 
However, interpreting "nonphysical things" to mean 
"immaterial, substantial, mental entities," as is clearly justi-
fied given Chisholm's remarks, reveals a problem with 
Chisholm's argument. Under this interpretation of 
"nonphysical things," Chisholm's assertion that the existence 
of persons entails that persons are either physical things or 
nonphysical things is false. This dichotomy is not exhaustive: 
there remains the possibility that the person is an entity 
which has both physical and mental properties but which is 
neither a physical nor a nonphysical thing. Indeed, this is 
Peter Strawson's view.5 
Referring to his microparticle thesis, Chisholm challenged 
the philosophical community by saying, "I would suggest that 
if this philosophic hypothesis seems implausible to you, you 
try to formulate one that is less implausible."6 A quick reply to 
this is that Strawson's view, which is not vulnerable to any of 
the criticisms raised by Chisholm against the positing of 
mental substances, is less implausible than Chisholm's view 
because it adequately provides for the predication of both 
physical and mental properties to persons without implausibly 
asserting that the person is literally identical with a 
microscopic particle in that person's brain. 
There is another problem with Chisholm's argument. Be-
lieving he has already established that the person is a 
Peter Strawson, "Persons," in The Philosophy of Mind, ed. V. C. 
Chappell (New York: Dover, 1981), pp. 127-46. 
Chisholm, "Mind-Body Problem," p. 32. 
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physical thing, Chisholm says there arc sound arguments 
which show that the person is not identical with his gross 
macroscopic body and concludes, on this basis, that the person is 
identical with "some intact, non-successive part that has been 
in this larger body all along," most likely a microparticle 
located within the brain. 
Chisholm's assertion is problematic because the only one of 
these "sound arguments" which Chisholm provides is the fol-
lowing: 
The body that persists through time... is an ens successivum. That 
is to say, it is an entity which is made up of different things at 
different times... Now one could say that an ens successivum has 
different "stand-ins" at different times and that these stand-ins do 
duty for the successive entity at the different times... 
Am / an entity such that different things do duty for me at 
different days? Is it one thing that does my feeling depressed for 
me today and another thing that did it yesterday and still another 
thing that will do it tomorrow? If I happen to be feeling sad, then 
surely there is no other thing that is doing my feeling sad for me. 
We must reject the view that persons are thus entia successiva? 
Surely Chisholm is being very misleading here. It is absurd 
to suppose a person feels sad only in virtue of the fact that some 
other thing feels sad; however, this absurdity is not entailed 
by the proposition that the person is an ens successivum or 
logical construction. According to theories of this type, a person 
(a temporally extended series of "person-stages") is properly 
said to feel sad in virtue of the fact that something (a "person-
stage") which constitutes him at the present time feels sad. 
Hence, such theories do not entail that a person feels sad only 
in virtue of the fact that some thing other than the person 
himself feels sad for him, because the feeling entity is simply a 
stage of the person himself.8 
Therefore, even if Chisholm previously had provided good 
reason to believe that the person is a physical thing, he has not 
given us any reason to believe that the person is identical with 
7Chisholm, "Mind-Body Problem," p. 32. 
8For a more comprehensive discussion of this argument, see Susan 
Leigh Anderson's "Chisholm's Argument To Show That A Person 
Cannot Be an Ens Successivum," Philosophical Studies 37 (1980): 111-
13. 
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an intact, non-successive brain microparticle; for he has not 
provided any reason to reject an alternative to the 
microparticle thesis which clearly has greater prima facie 
plausibility, namely the view that the person is identical 
with his gross, macroscopic body. 
Thus, nothing Chisholm has said in arguing for his mi-
croparticle thesis gives us reason to believe that his aforemen-
tioned challenge to the philosophical community cannot be met 
successfully. In fact, because both Strawson's theory of the 
person and the view that the person is identical with his gross 
body are of greater prima facie plausibility than Chisholm's 
microparticle thesis, there is good reason to believe that 
Chisholm's challenge can be answered effectively. 
In order to realize that Chisholm's challenge is more 
formidable than it initially appears, we must turn to the other 
tenets of Chisholm's personal identity theory. Chisholm sub-
scribes to the position championed by both Bishop Butler and 
Thomas Reid, namely, that persons remain self-identical 
through time in a "strict and philosophical sense." This posi-
tion is composed of two related tenets: 
(1) The question, "Is X the same person at time t as Y is at time 
ti?", is never a question which is properly decided by a 
conventional definitional decision, but rather always has a 
definite, "ontologically correct" answer.9 (In other words, given 
the concepts "person" and "the same person" and the facts of the 
particular case, there is one and only one correct answer to any 
question of personal identity.) 
(2) Persons persist in a sense which implies, "if a person may be 
said to exist at a certain place P at a certain time t and also at a 
certain place Q at a certain other time t], then we may infer that 
something existing at P at t is identical with something existing at 
Q and t^." 1 0 (In other words, a person is not merely a logical 
construction composed of person-stages related in certain ways 
(e.g., causation, contiguity and resemblance] involving certain 
types of continuity.) 
9Roderick Chisholm, "Identity Through Time," in Language, Belief 
and Metaphysics, ed. Howard E. Kiefer and Milton K. Munitz (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1970), p. 175. 
10Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object (London: George Allen and 
Unwin,Ltd.,1976),p.97. 
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Henceforth we will refer to these two tenets as "Chisholm's 
first strictness claim" and "Chisholm's second strictness claim," 
respectively. 
Both of Chisholm's claims regarding the strictness of per-
sonal identity can be supported by a line of argument which is 
compatible with Chisholm 's metaphilosophical and 
substantive philosophical positions. In his Person and Object, 
Chisholm advances his metaphilosophy of common sense: he 
holds that the basic premises of our philosophical inquiries 
should be those propositions which we presuppose in our 
ordinary activity and that such propositions should be 
affirmed until we have positive reason for denying them. 1 1 
There are many propositions we presuppose in our ordinary 
activity which are relevant to the issue of personal identity. 
Surely, one of these is that we have good reason to be concerned 
with our own future fortunes. If we did not presuppose this to be 
the case, all of our behavior which is calculated either to im-
prove our lot in the long run or to forestall a deterioration in our 
long-term quality of life would be irrational. 
In addition, no matter how sympathetic we are with other 
people, we are not concerned with their future fortunes to the 
same extent, with the same intensity or in the same way as we 
are concerned with our own. John Perry makes this point quite 
well: 
Most of us have a special and intense interest in what will happen 
to us. You learn that someone will be run over by a truck 
tomorrow; you are saddened, feel pity, and think reflectively about 
the frailty of life; one bit of information is added, that the 
someone is you, and a whole new set of emotions rise in your 
breast. 1 2 
Thus, we presuppose that we have special reason to be con-
cerned about our own future fortunes. 
Let us narrow our focus to those attitudes which we have 
toward our own future pleasurable and painful experiences: we 
eagerly await, the former and dread the latter. These attitudes 
"Chisholm, Person and Object, p. 16. 
1 2John Perry, "The Importance of Being Identical," in The Identities of 
Persons , ed. Amelie O. Rorty (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1976), p. 67. 
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manifest themselves in our numerous attempts to secure such 
pleasurable experiences and avoid such painful experiences. 
What is the fundamental presupposition underlying these 
attitudes and behaviors, without which they would be irra-
tional? Clearly, we presuppose that our "future self (the self 
that will experience our future pains and pleasures) is the same 
subject of experience as our "present self (the self which seeks 
to avoid future painful experiences and to enjoy future pleasur-
able experiences). If I didn't believe that I am the same subject 
of experience as the subject of experience who will undergo a 
given painful experience, why should I have that special and 
intense concern to avoid that painful experience that I so obvi-
ously do? 1 3 
What propositions regarding the strictness of personal 
identity can be established, given that it is a presupposition of 
our ordinary activities that throughout the course of our lives 
there persists a self-identical subject of experience? First of all, 
we should elaborate upon the formulation of this presuppo-
sition. It is apparent that we presuppose not only that such a 
self-identical subject of experience persists throughout the 
course of a person's life, but also that such persistence is a 
necessary condition of personal identity. We can see this by 
imagining our reaction to being told the following: "We will 
conduct an experiment designed to test endurance of pain. You 
will be the subject of our experiment and therefore will have to 
endure great pain. However, the subject of experience which 
has just been told that he will have to endure great pain will 
not be the subject of experience which will actually feel the 
pain." My reaction to this, which I trust would be the same as 
the reaction of persons generally, would be that the preceding 
statement was internally inconsistent because a necessary 
condition of my being the person who will endure painful 
experience X is my being the same subject of experience as the 
subject of experience which will endure painful experience X. 
1 3 Even John Perry, who believes that nothing about the person 
remains strictly identical over time and that personal identity is 
merely a relation which holds among temporary psychological states, 
concedes that one's special concern for one's future is not fully 
justified if no self-identical subject of experience persists throughout 
the course of one's life. See "The Importance of Being Identical/' p. 
80. 
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Clearly, we also presuppose that the persistence of an 
identical subject of experience is a sufficient condition of 
personal identity. Imagine being told that there was going to 
be an experiment in which a person who had no continuity with 
you in terms of macro-bodily or psychological characteristics, 
but who would be the same subject of experience as you are, 
would be put through tremendous pain.1 4 You would be terrified 
and would take every available step to prevent this 
experiment from taking place because you would believe that 
you would have to endure tremendous pain. 
Geoffrey Madell's thought may be used to show that the 
proposition that the persistence of a self-identical subject of 
experience is a necessary and sufficient condition of personal 
identity implies that each question of personal identity has a 
definite, ontologically correct answer. 1 5 The relevant implica-
tions of Madell's work can be most readily conveyed by em-
ploying the notions of "subject of experience" and "unity of 
consciousness" in connection with psychological characteristics. 
At any given time, a person is aware of many different things. 
For example, if I am having a face-to-face conversation with 
my friend, and he happens to be talking at present, I am 
directly aware of at least five things. I see various things, in-
cluding his face and his moving lips, and am aware that 1 am 
seeing these things. I hear various things, including his voice, 
and am aware that I am hearing these things. I am also aware 
that I am both seeing and hearing at the same time. 
This last point involves the unity of consciousness. In any 
present state of consciousness that anyone has, there is a unity 
of which that person is directly aware. Therefore, it is an evi-
dent truth that any present state of consciousness is either 
wholly mine or wholly not mine: I either "have" the entire 
state of consciousness or "have" none of it. It is absurd to 
suppose that there could be a present state of consciousness 
which is partially mine and partially not mine, i.e., that the 
1 4 The persistence of a subject of experience being a sufficient 
condition of personal identity is consistent with the truth of Chisholm's 
microparticle thesis provided that, as Chisholm assumes ("Mind-Body 
Problem," p. 31), the microparticle is the subject of experience. 
1 5Geoffrey Madell, The Identity of Self (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1981). 
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"mineness" of a present state of consciousness could be a matter 
of degree.1 6 
The fundamental importance of this truth for the issue of 
personal identity will be made evident by the following exam-
ple. Suppose that at time] there is a person (A) who has a 
given state of consciousness (X). Suppose also that there is a 
state of consciousness (Y) which is possessed by a person (B) at 
t ime 1 0 . If the persistence of a self-identical subject of experi-
ence is a necessary and sufficient condition of personal identity, 
any question of personal identity must have a definite, 
ontologically correct answer since any question regarding the 
identity of a subject of experience must have a definite, onto-
logically correct answer. If you ask yourself, "Will the subject 
of experience that I (person A) am at time! be the same subject of 
experience as that subject of experience who has state of con-
sciousness Y at timeno?", the correct answer must be either "yes" 
or "no." It could not be a matter of degree to be settled by a 
linguistic convention of some sort; for this would imply that 
state of consciousness Y is partially owned, i.e., owned to a 
certain degree, by the subject of experience that I am at time]. 
As we have seen, the fact of the unity of consciousness implies 
that such partial ownership of a state of consciousness is im-
possible. Hence, Chisholm's claim that every question of per-
sonal identity has a definite, ontologically correct answer is 
supported by the soundness of this line of argument. 
Chisholm's second claim regarding the strictness of per-
sonal identity, i.e., that personal identity is not merely the 
"identity" that characterizes a logical construction, but rather 
is characterized by the intact, non-successive persistence of 
something, is also supported by the soundness of the foregoing 
line of argument; for we have seen both that it is a presupposi-
tion of our ordinary attitudes and activities that there is some 
basis for our special and intense concern for our own future 
pleasurable and painful experiences and that the truth of this 
presupposition implies that there persists a strictly identical, 
i.e., intact and non-successive, subject of experience throughout 
the course of a person's life. 
1 6The truth of this proposition is entailed by Chisholm's treatment of 
the unity of consciousness. See his The First Person (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 85-90. 
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Even though the presuppositions of various of our ordinary 
activities and attitudes in conjunction with the aforementioned 
truth regarding the unity of consciousness provide good reason to 
affirm Chisholm's first strictness claim, we may nevertheless 
have to deny Chisholm's first strictness claim in light of con-
siderations adduced by Derek Parfit. 
Parfit discusses David Wiggins' hypothetical case of 
human fission and uses it to formulate a very powerful objection 
to the proposition that every question of personal identity has 
a definite, ontologically correct answer. Parfit describes 
Wiggins' case and poses the question raised by it as follows: 
Wiggins then imagined his own operation. My brain is divided 
and each half is housed in a new body. Both resulting people 
have my character and apparent memories of my life. What 
happens to me? There seem only three possibilities: (1) I do not 
survive; (2) I survive as one of the two people; (3) I survive as 
both. 1 7 
Parfit says that the first alternative is i m p l a u s i b l e 
because it is clear both that I could survive if my brain were 
successfully transplanted and that people have in fact survived 
with half of their brain destroyed. Parfit says it seems to 
follow from these two true propositions that I could survive if 
half of my brain were successfully transplanted and the other 
half destroyed. He then dismisses the possibility that I do not 
survive the brain bisection operation with these rhetorical 
questions based upon the preceding line of argument: 
But if this is so, how could I not survive if the other half were also 
successfully transplanted? How could a double success be a 
failure?18 
Parfit then examines the plausibility of the second 
alternative, namely, that I survive as one of the two people. 
He says this is highly implausible because each half of my 
brain and each resulting person is exactly similar: 
1 7Derek Parfit, "Personal Identity," in Personal Identity, ed. John Perry 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 
200-1. 
1 8Parfit,p.201. 
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So how can I survive as only one of the two people? What can 
make me one of them rather than another? 1 9 
Parfit then discusses the plausibility of the third alterna-
tive, namely, that I survive as both. He says that there is the 
possibility that what we have been calling "the two resulting 
people" are not really two people. Rather, it could be that 
there is only one person with a divided mind. 
In order to give us an idea of what having a divided mind 
would be like, Parfit outlines a hypothetical case modeled 
upon some actual cases in which, as part of a treatment for 
epilepsy, the bridge between the hemispheres of the brain was 
severed with the effect that two separate spheres of 
consciousness were created-each sphere having the same type 
of unity that a person's consciousness normally has and each 
sphere controlling half of the patient's body. 
Parfit concludes that this third alternative is highly im-
plausible since in Wiggins' case the "mind" in question was 
permanently "divided," "its halves" were housed in two 
different bodies and were capable of developing in quite 
different ways, and each of the two beings produced by the 
hypothesized operation possessed all the qualities of a person. 
Parfit then argues that because it is the case both that none 
of these three alternatives is at all plausible and that the 
proposition that every question of personal identity has a 
definite, ontologically correct answer (Chisholm's first 
strictness claim) implies that these three alternatives are 
jointly exhaustive and hence implies that one of them is true, 
we have good reason to believe that this proposition 
(Chisholm's first strictness claim) is false. In other words, 
because denying Chisholm's first strictness claim logically 
permits one to hold that the question of personal identity at 
hand (the question, "What happens to me?", as it relates to 
Wiggins' case) does not have a definite, ontologically correct 
answer and thereby logically permits one to deny the otherwise 
undeniable yet highly implausible claim that one of the three 
aforementioned alternatives is true, we have good reason for 
denying Chisholm's first strictness claim. 
The challenge posed by Parfit's argument is formidable; 
however, Chisholm's microparticle thesis may provide him 
1 9Parfit,p.201. 
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with an effective rebuttal. If his microparticle thesis is true, 
Chisholm could respond to Parfit in the following way: "Your 
conclusion (that we have good reason to believe that the 
proposition that every question of personal identity has a 
definite, ontologically correct answer is false) has not been 
established, because you have not established your claim that 
none of the three alternatives is at all plausible. Given the 
truth of my microparticle thesis, we can assert that the second 
alternative ('I survive as one of the two people*) is true and 
give a straightforward, satisfactory answer to your questions, 
'So how can I survive as only one of the two people? What can 
make me one of them rather than the other?' 2 0 The answer is 
that one of the survivors is me because this survivor is the one 
who has as part of his brain the microparticle which is me, 
while the other survivor is not me because that survivor does 
not have this microparticle. Thus, you have not shown that we 
have good reason to believe that my claim (that a question of 
personal identity always has a definite, ontologically correct 
answer) is false." 
Is this an effective response to Parfit's challenge? We can 
formulate this question as follows: Is the microparticle thesis 
itself less implausible than the denial of the proposition 
(Chisholm's first strictness claim) which it has been used to 
defend? This question cannot be answered adequately without 
distinguishing between two kinds of implausibility. We define 
"scientific implausibility" as that type of implausibility 
which characterizes a claim or theory that either conflicts 
course, in the extremely unlikely event that the brain were 
bisected in such a way as to sever or destroy the microparticle that is 
identical with the person, the person would not survive at all since the 
person is identical with an intact, non-successive microparticle. The 
fact that the microparticle must be intact and non-successive rules out 
the third alternative, namely, that I would survive as both persons, 
since it rules out "double survival" through microparticle bisection. 
The important point to remember is that no matter what happens to 
the microparticle, whether it is destroyed, bisected or preserved, each 
and every question of personal identity will have a definite, 
ontologically correct answer which is grounded upon a specifiable 
fact, namely, the persistence or non-persistence of a certain intact, 
non-successive microparticle in the brain. (Of course, this holds true 
not only for cases of brain bisection but for all cases, including those 
involving fission, fusion and duplication.) 
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with well-established scientific knowledge or should already 
have been verified by the relevant scientists if it were true but 
has not been so verified. We mean by "metaphysical 
implausibility" that type of implausibility which 
characterizes a claim or theory that conflicts with 
metaphysical presuppositions of our ordinary activities. 
At first glance, Chisholm's microparticle thesis appears to 
be scientifically implausible, for one could object to it as fol-
lows: "Chisholm's microparticle thesis couldn't be correct be-
cause, given the advanced state of the science of brain physiol-
ogy, brain physiologists would already have discovered this 
microparticle." 
The objection is misguided. In order to see this, we must 
remember that the microparticle which Chisholm alleges to be 
identical with the person is a physical entity (and thereby has 
certain physical characteristics) which has the non-physical 
property of being the person (the subject of consciousness). 
While it is true that the microparticle's physical characteris-
tics (e.g., its size, shape, weight, color, etc.) are empirically 
observable, its property of being the subject of experience is not 
empirically observable. Thus, if Chisholm's microparticle 
thesis is correct, brain physiologists may have run across such a 
particle but did not and could not have learned of its signifi-
cant, non-physical property: i.e., they could not have appre-
hended it as the person (the subject of experience). 
The following related objection could be raised: "Chisholm 
claims that a certain brain microparticle is the person and 
therefore that this brain microparticle performs the many 
highly complex psychological functions the person performs. 
This flies in the face of the well-established findings of the 
science of brain psychology which indicate that the highly 
complex mental operations performed by the person are not 
performed by a single brain microparticle, but rather by various 
large and highly complex parts of the brain." 
This objection overlooks a fundamental distinction21 made 
by Chisholm. According to Chisholm, the brain microparticle 
that is identical with the person is the subject of consciousness, 
not the organ of consciousness (the brain). Therefore, Chisholm 
is not claiming that the person's highly complex psychological 
functions are performed via the material stuff of a certain brain 
21Chisholm, "Mind-Body Problem," p. 31. 
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microparticle. Rather, he believes that the person (the brain 
microparticle) is the subject of consciousness, i.e, the experiencer 
of experiences, the thinker of thoughts, the feeler of feelings, 
etc., but that the human brain is the organ through which such 
functions are performed. 
A third objection could be raised: "According to Chisholm's 
view, there is a microparticle which persists uncorrupted 
throughout a person's life. This runs contrary to the scientific 
finding that cells in various parts of the body are periodically 
replaced by a process of cell division (reproduction) and cell 
death."22 
This objection ignores the scientifically established truth 
that many brain cells (the neurons in the brain) never reproduce 
themselves through cell division after birth and hence that all 
the many brain neurons which a person dies with were present 
throughout that person's entire life. 2 3 
Despite initial appearances to the contrary, this would not 
be an effective response as presently formulated, for it does not 
address the question of whether or not such brain neurons or any 
of their parts are intact, non-successive entities. Of course, only 
if any of these entities were intact and non-successive would 
their existence ground the possibility of the "intact, non-
successive brain microparticle/person" posited by Chisholm's 
theory. However, I am not scientifically qualified to interpret 
the latest findings of brain physiology and related sciences to 
determine what, if anything, they would imply or suggest on 
this highly technical question of whether or not brain neurons 
either contain or are themselves intact, non-successive entities. 
Thus, while it has become obvious that Chisholm could 
answer at least some of the scientific implausibility objections 
that could be raised, it is unclear whether or not he would be 
able to answer the last of the aforementioned objections or, more 
generally, whether or not he could effectively rebut all objec-
tions owing to some alleged scientific implausibility of his mi-
croparticle thesis. 
Is Chisholm's microparticle thesis less metaphysically 
implausible than the denial of Chisholm's first strictness 
^Richard F. Thompson, The Brain (New York: W. H. Freeman and 
Company, 1985), p. 271. 
Thompson, p. 271. 
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claim? This is very difficult to pronounce upon with confidence; 
however, we can offer the following considerations. 
As we have seen, Chisholm's claim that every question of 
personal identity has a definite, ontologically correct answer is 
implied by presuppositions of our ordinary activities and atti-
tudes relating to our future pleasurable and painful experiences 
which are fundamental to our conception of the person. In 
contrast, Chisholm's microparticle thesis speaks to an issue on 
which common sense does not testify univocally. 
In response to the question, "What is the nature of the per-
son?", the presuppositions of our ordinary activities and atti-
tudes provide conflicting answers. On the one hand, we presup-
pose that the person's survival is dependent upon the survival 
of that person's body as a functioning organic entity. This pre-
supposition underlies many of our ordinary activities and at-
titudes, including many of our medical practices and our atti-
tude of grief in response to the bodily death of a loved one. On 
the other hand, many of us tend to identify the person with an 
immaterial soul which is somehow separable from his or her 
physical body and thereby believe that the person can survive 
the death of his or her body. This belief is presupposed by 
such activities as attempting to communicate with deceased 
persons through any one of a number of occult methods (e.g., 
seances) and praying for the souls of dead people; and by a be-
liever's attitude of fear, joy or uncertainty as he or she nears 
death and looks forward to his or her anticipated fate in the 
afterlife. 
It is important to note that Chisholm's microparticle thesis 
is compatible with some of these presuppositions of our ordi-
nary activities and attitudes. While the microparticle thesis 
is incompatible with the claims that the person is identical 
with an immaterial soul and that the person's survival is 
dependent upon the survival of that person's body, it is clearly 
compatible with the view that a person can survive the death 
of his or her body. As Chisholm notes, his microparticle thesis 
implies, "that the destruction of the gross physical body does 
not logically imply the destruction of the person," since the 
intact, non-successive persistence of a certain brain 
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microparticle is necessary and sufficient for the existence of 
personal identity.2 4 
Thus, Chisholm's microparticle thesis appears to be less 
metaphysically implausible (i.e., appears to conflict to a lesser 
degree with the metaphysical presuppositions of our ordinary 
activities and attitudes) than the denial of his first strictness 
claim; for the microparticle thesis is logically incompatible 
with only some of the conflicting set of relevant presuppositions 
of our ordinary activities and attitudes, while the denial of 
the first strictness claim is logically incompatible with the 
most fundamental of the relevant presuppositions of our ordi-
nary activities and attitudes. 
If it is the case both that Chisholm's microparticle thesis 
can deal as effectively with all scientific implausibility objec-
tions as it did with the first two of the aforementioned ones and 
that it is less metaphysically implausible than the denial of 
Chisholm's first strictness claim (as it appears to be), then the 
microparticle thesis is less implausible than the denial of 
Chisholm's first strictness claim. As such, employing the mi-
croparticle thesis to defend Chisholm's first strictness claim 
against Parfit's argument makes more sense than affirming 
Parfit's conclusion (the denial of Chisholm's first strictness 
claim). Clearly, Parfit has not shown that we have good 
reason to reject Chisholm's first strictness claim if Parfit's 
argument (the soundness and, indeed, the entire logical force of 
which presupposes the falsity of the microparticle thesis) can 
be undermined by the truth of a theory (the microparticle 
thesis) which is less implausible than Parfit's conclusion. 
At this juncture, it will clarify the matters under discussion 
to define some of the basic concepts of Chisholm's theory of 
epistemic preferability: 
2 4Chisholm, "Mind-Body Problem," p. 31. It appears that Chisholm's 
position is that such a microparticle's being in a brain is not a 
necessary condition of the existence of personal identity since he says 
that the person is literally identical with an intact, non-successive 
microparticle ("Mind-Body Problem," p. 31). Thus, the person would 
persist if the microparticle persists, regardless of whether the 
microparticle is located within a brain. This irrelevance of 
microparticle location to the possibility of personal identity implies 
that the existence of personal identity is logically compatible with the 
destruction of the gross physical body. 
16 AUSLEGUNG 
h is beyond reasonable doubt for S ~M Accepting h is more 
reasonable for S than is withholding h [i.e., neither accepting 
h nor accepting not-h]. 
h has some presumption in its favour for S = d f Accepting h is 
more reasonable for S than accepting not-h. 
h is acceptable for S = ^ Withholding h is no more reasonable for 
S than accepting h. 2 5 
Thus, in Chisholm's terminology, we have shown that, 
given that Chisholm could effectively rebut any remaining 
scientific implausibility objections, it appears as if his 
microparticle thesis can be used to defend his first strictness 
claim against Parfit's attack in such a way as to establish a 
presumption in favor of his first strictness claim; for we have 
seen that it appears to be more reasonable to accept Chisholm's 
first strictness claim by defending it with the microparticle 
thesis than to accept with Parfit the denial of Chisholm's first 
strictness claim. 
We may now address our central concern: Is there a pre-
sumption in favor of Chisholm's microparticle thesis? In order 
to answer this question we must determine whether there is a 
less implausible way to successfully defend Chisholm's first 
strictness claim against Parfit's challenge. Since it is clear 
Parfit is correct in asserting both that the proposition that ev-
ery question of personal identity has a definite, ontologically 
correct answer implies that one of the three alternative 
answers to the question posed by Wiggins' case is true and that 
the utter implausibility of all three of these answers counts 
heavily against the truth of this proposition, we can 
accurately determine whether there is a less implausible way 
to defend Chisholm's first strictness claim against Parfit's 
argument by ascertaining whether there is a less implausible 
way to rebut Parfit's contention that all three alternatives are 
highly implausible. 
Although it is impossible to conclusively answer this ques-
tion without examining all the possible theories of personal 
identity, there are good grounds for asserting that there is no 
less implausible way to rebut Parfit's contention. After all, the 
standard and normally effective ways of deciding questions of 
^Chisholm, Person and Object, pp. 177-78. 
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personal identity—having recourse to considerations involving 
bodily identity or psychological continuity (including facts 
about memory and character)~arc incapable of furnishing any 
plausibility for any of the three alternative possibilities in 
Wiggins' case. If these standard and usually effective types of 
considerations are impotent, what other types of considerations 
could reasonably be expected to render any one of the three al-
ternatives plausible? 
Given both that Chisholm's claim that every question of 
personal identity has a definite, ontologically correct answer 
has some presumption in its favor and that there is no more 
plausible way to defend this claim against an otherwise 
decisive objection than by using Chisholm's microparticle 
thesis to do so, the microparticle thesis must itself have some 
presumption in its favor.2* 
Thus, notwithstanding initial appearances to the contrary, 
it now appears that Chisholm's challenge to the 
philosophical community, "I would suggest that if this 
philosophic hypothesis [the microparticle thesis] seems im-
plausible to you, you try to formulate one that is less implausi-
ble," has not been met to this day; for if the microparticle the-
sis has some presumption in its favor it is more plausible than 
its negation and hence more plausible than any alternative 
theory which entails its negation.2 7 
2 6Thus, Chisholm can provide an effective rebuttal to each of the 
following claims alluded to earlier: (1) Strawson's theory of the person 
is more plausible than Chisholm's microparticle thesis and (2) the 
view that the person is identical with the gross macroscopic body is 
more plausible than the microparticle thesis. These claims can be 
effectively countered by the reply that neither of the views referred to 
can be used to save Chisholm's highly plausible first strictness claim 
(the denial of which apparently is more implausible than Chishom's 
microparticle thesis itself). 
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